How Payload Ransomware Works and How to Test Your Defenses

Key Takeaways

  • Payload is a ransomware and data extortion operation that surfaced in February 2026, encrypting Windows and Linux/ESXi hosts.
  • Payload encryptors are built on the Babuk source leaked in September 2021, with HC-128 replaced by ChaCha20.
  • A fresh Curve25519 key pair per file leaves Payload victims with no recovery path without the operator's private key.
  • Some Payload intrusions deploy no encryptor at all, disrupting an entire Windows domain through two malicious Group Policy Objects.
  • Payload gains access with valid stolen domain credentials against remote services, with no CVE exploitation on record.
  • The Picus Platform simulates Payload ransomware attacks so teams can validate security controls against this threat.

Payload is a ransomware and data extortion operation that surfaced in February 2026 [1]. Victims are mostly in manufacturing, retail, logistics, construction, and healthcare, concentrated in Germany, Egypt, the United States, and Singapore. In some intrusions, the encryptor never touches a Windows endpoint.

Payload builds its encryptors on the Babuk source code leaked in September 2021. The operators replaced Babuk’s HC-128 cipher with ChaCha20 and generate a fresh Curve25519 key pair for every file. They also added anti-forensics the original Babuk code never had, including ETW patching, a full event log channel wipe, and self-deletion through an NTFS alternate data stream [2].

Payload Ransomware at a Glance

Field

Detail

Malware type

Ransomware and data extortion

Earliest recorded activity

17 February 2026

Platforms

Windows and Linux/ESXi

Code lineage

Leaked Babuk source from September 2021.

Initial access

Valid domain credentials against external remote services.

File encryption

Curve25519 ECDH key agreement with ChaCha20, a fresh key pair per file.

Encryption scope

Full encryption below 2 GB. Files above 2 GB receive 20 percent encryption.

Encrypted file extension

.payload

Mutex

MakeAmericaGreatAgain

Ransom notes

RECOVER_payload.txt
RECOVERY-xx0001.txt
README-payload.txt

Recovery disruption

Shadow copy deletion, backup and security service termination, process termination, recycle bin emptying

Anti-forensics

ETW patching, event log wipe, self-deletion through an NTFS alternate data stream

Command and control

None. The Windows encryptor runs offline

Negotiation

Tor portal with per victim credentials

What Is Payload Ransomware?

The operators steal data before encryption, publish victim names on their dedicated leak site, and negotiate through a separate Tor portal using credentials issued per victim. The ransom note has no wallet address [2].

The Windows and Linux builds carry different operator public keys, which allows separate key generation per campaign or per affiliate [2].

Babuk Lineage

The service and process kill lists, the curve25519-donna implementation with its clamping logic and the constant 121665, the shadow copy deletion command, and the core of the directory and file exclusion lists all match the leaked Babuk source code [2].

Feature

Babuk (2021)

Payload (2026)

Symmetric cipher

HC-128

ChaCha20

Key derivation

SHA-512 of the shared secret

Shared secret used directly

File footer

104 bytes, plaintext, CRC32

56 bytes, RC4 encrypted, payload\0 marker

Command line

Named arguments such as debug, shares, paths

12 switches, most of them single letters

Mutex

A string taunting researcher Chuong Dong

MakeAmericaGreatAgain

Extension

.babyk

.payload

Ransom note storage

Plaintext, patched by the builder

RC4 encrypted and base64 encoded in .rdata

Large file threshold

Multiple tiers at 20 MB and 5 MB

Single threshold at 2 GB, 20 percent encrypted

Self deletion

Not present

NTFS ADS rename to :payload

ETW bypass

Not present

Patches four ntdll functions

Event log wipe

Not present

Enumerates and clears every channel

The Linux and ESXi Build

The Linux build is a 39 KB stripped ELF aimed at ESXi hosts. It links libxml2 and parses /etc/vmware/hostd/vmInventory.xml through XPath to locate virtual machine disk paths for targeted encryption.

Its anti-debugging checks read /proc/self/status and checks TracerPid for a non-zero value [2].

The cryptography matches the Windows build down to the three-byte RC4 footer key. The Linux build has no service or process killer, no shadow copy deletion, no event log wiper, no ETW patcher, no mutex, and no self-deletion routine [2].

What Are the Major Activities of the Payload Ransomware Group?

  • 17 February 2026 - Emerges with Windows and ESXi encryptors.
  • 15 March 2026 - Claims a breach of Royal Bahrain Hospital, posting 110 GB with a 23 March deadline [1].
  • 13 April 2026 - Cripples a Middle East manufacturer through two malicious GPOs linked at the domain root, encrypting nothing on Windows [3].
  • 13 June 2026 - Lists the Intellectual Property Corporation of Malaysia with 35 GB, its first national government agency [1].
  • 20 August 2026 - Hits Swiss provider Qualiflex Datacenter with 490 GB, its largest claim, reaching hosted customers including HWZ Zurich [1].

How Does Payload Ransomware Work?

Tactic: Initial Access

T1078 Valid Accounts

In the April 2026 incident, the entry vector was a compromised domain account used to authenticate to the perimeter [3].

The account held enough rights to create and link a GPO at the domain root. That means either domain admin privileges or a delegated equivalent, such as membership of Group Policy Creator Owners combined with link rights on the domain object [3].

T1133 External Remote Services

The entry point was the organization’s FortiGate SSL VPN. No vulnerability was exploited, and Payload has not been linked to any specific CVE. The operator logged in through the normal remote access path with a stolen credential [3].

Tactic: Privilege Escalation

T1484.001 Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification

A GPO linked at the domain root applies to every computer and user object beneath it [3].

Payload operators created two GPOs and linked both at the root.

PAYLOAD           {C897F2C7-C2AC-4E6F-BF48-58036FF29E79}

win Firewall Off  {22099AD2-E062-4F56-B574-5099BBA4E7A6}

GPO extension

Setting or path

Resulting action

Files (Group Policy Preference)

SYSVOL hello.txt to Desktop, C:\ and D:\

Dropped as README-payload.txt, read only

Registry (Computer)

legalnoticecaption

Set to Welcome to Payload!

Registry (Computer)

legalnoticetext

Set to the ransom demand text

Personalization Policy

Lock screen image

Points to payload.jpg in SYSVOL

Desktop Policy (User)

Wallpaper path

Points to payload.jpg in SYSVOL

Security Settings (GptTmpl.inf)

Administrator account status

Disabled

Table 1. Settings delivered by the PAYLOAD GPO [3].

The two registry values rewrite the pre-logon legal notice, so the ransom demand appears before anyone can sign in.

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\legalnoticecaption = Welcome to Payload!

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\legalnoticetext    = <ransom demand text>

The wallpaper image and ransom note were staged on the domain controller’s SYSVOL share and pushed to endpoints through the Files client-side extension [3].

\\DC.THECOMPANY.local\sysvol\THECOMPANY.local\payload.jpg   # wallpaper and lock screen image

\\DC.THECOMPANY.local\sysvol\THECOMPANY.local\hello.txt     # source of README-payload.txt

The GPOs were authored on 13 April, with visible impact landing a day later because computer configuration settings apply on reboot or policy refresh and no endpoint had rebooted in the interim. That gap gave the operator a quiet window for exfiltration and broke the temporal link between the GPO creation event in the directory log and the mass disruption that followed [3].

Tactic: Defense Impairment

T1685 Disable or Modify Tools

The bypass-etw switch patches four functions in ntdll.dll. The encryptor makes the page writable with VirtualProtect, overwrites each function prologue, and restores the protection [2].

; prologue overwritten in ntdll.dll for

; EtwEventWrite, EtwEventWriteFull, EtwEventWriteTransfer, EtwRegister


48 33 C0 C3       ; WoW64 build:  xor rax, rax ; ret

33 C0 C2 14 00    ; native x86:   xor eax, eax ; ret 0x14

Both patches make the function return STATUS_SUCCESS immediately, so every trace event it would have written is dropped. EDR that depends on ETW for process-level visibility loses that feed. The patch applies to the encryptor’s own copy of ntdll.dll, so ETW keeps working elsewhere on the host [3][2].

The binary also stops services through the Service Control Manager API and kills processes through toolhelp snapshots.

The service list covers backup infrastructure such as Veeam and Acronis and security products such as Sophos and Qihoo 360. The 31 entry process list covers database engines, Office applications, mail clients, and browsers. Both lists are character identical to the lists in the leaked Babuk source [2].

T1685.005 Disable or Modify Tools: Clear Windows Event Logs

The l switch triggers a wipe of every Windows event log channel. The binary loads wevtapi.dll at runtime, which keeps the APIs out of its import table, enumerates all channels, and clears them one by one. Application, Security, System, and every custom operational channel are cleared [2].

wevtapi.dll          # loaded at runtime, absent from the import table

EvtOpenChannelEnum   # open the channel enumeration handle

EvtNextChannelPath   # walk every channel, operational ones included

EvtClearLog          # clear each channel in turn

T1686 Disable or Modify System Firewall

The second GPO, named win Firewall Off, disabled Windows Firewall on the domain, private, and public profiles across all endpoints. It was linked at the domain root independently of the PAYLOAD GPO [3].

Tactic: Stealth

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information

The ransom note is stored in the .rdata section as an RC4 encrypted, base64 encoded blob.

The RC4 key for the note sits separately at virtual address 0x452DC8 as a base64 string that decodes to the 32-character ASCII key hQEPINuTY2lytufLDpJQdVkrWlovC1QR [2].

0x4F560: "expand 32-byte k"    ChaCha20 sigma constant (16 bytes)

0x4F570: "FBI\0"               RC4 key for the file footer (3 bytes + null)

0x4F574: "aH9Tbdc+qPcQ..."     operator Curve25519 public key, base64 (44 bytes)

0x4F5A0: \0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0      padding (8 bytes)

0x4F5A8: "IlhBex9EMIS7..."     RC4 encrypted ransom note, base64 (2528 bytes)

T1564.004 Hide Artifacts: NTFS File Attributes

The binary renames its own $DATA stream to an alternate data stream named :payload. The rename releases the file lock Windows holds on a running executable, which normally blocks a process from deleting itself [2].

T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion

After the stream rename, the binary reopens the file and marks it for deletion on close. No cmd.exe child process is spawned, and no temporary batch file is written, so the self-deletion artifacts that most ransomware families leave in process telemetry never appear. The d switch turns the routine off [2].

Its verbose logging framework writes an execution log to C:\payload.log, which survives the self-deletion and makes a reliable host indicator [2].

T1622 Debugger Evasion

The Windows build uses GetTickCount timing checks. The Linux build reads /proc/self/status and treats a non-zero TracerPid value as a sign that it is being traced [2].

Tactic: Discovery

T1083 File and Directory Discovery

The Windows encryptor walks local and network drives and applies directory and file exclusion lists whose core comes from Babuk. It skips its own ransom note and any file that already carries the .payload extension. The i switch bypasses every filter [2].

On ESXi, the Linux build parses /etc/vmware/hostd/vmInventory.xml through XPath to pull virtual machine disk paths, then encrypts those paths [2].

T1135 Network Share Discovery

The Windows encryptor reaches network drives by default. The s switch skips network shares, which lets an operator keep a run local when a sweep across shares would be too noisy [2].

T1057 Process Discovery

The binary enumerates running processes through toolhelp snapshots before terminating the ones on its kill list [2]. In the April 2026 incident, Kaspersky GERT also recovered two standalone process killer tools, killer.exe and kill.exe, on the affected network [3].

Tactic: Collection

T1005 Data from Local System

In the April 2026 incident, exfiltration was observed originating from the file servers and several additional systems on 13 April, the same day the GPOs were authored [3].

Tactic: Impact

T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact

Payload uses Curve25519 ECDH for key agreement and ChaCha20 for file encryption. Each file gets a fresh key pair [2].

priv  = CryptGenRandom(32)              # Curve25519 private key, clamped

nonce = CryptGenRandom(12)              # ChaCha20 nonce

pub   = curve25519_base(priv)           # per file public key


key   = curve25519(priv, operator_pub)  # shared secret, used directly, no hashing step


# ChaCha20 over the file in 1 MB chunks:

#   NtReadFile -> encrypt -> seek back -> NtWriteFile


footer = RC4("FBI", pub || nonce || 4 bytes stack residue || "payload\0")

# 56 bytes, appended to the file


zero(priv); zero(pub)                   # wiped on the stack once the footer is written

The operator’s public key is decoded from base64 at startup. The shared secret becomes the ChaCha20 key directly, with no derivation step. The per file private key never reaches disk and lives in memory only for the duration of one file [2].

Files below 2 GB are encrypted in full. Files above 2 GB receive 20 percent encryption, calculated as file size divided by five, in 1 MB chunks spaced evenly through the file [2].

Without the operator’s Curve25519 private key, the files stay encrypted [2].

T1489 Service Stop

Stopping database, mail, virtualization, and backup services releases file handles so locked data can be modified, and interrupts the backup activity that would otherwise run during encryption [3][2].

T1490 Inhibit System Recovery

The encryptor deletes Volume Shadow Copies with the same command found in the leaked Babuk source [2].

vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet

T1491.001 Internal Defacement

The PAYLOAD GPO replaced the desktop wallpaper and the lock screen with payload.jpg served from SYSVOL, and rewrote the pre-logon legal notice to carry the ransom demand. The defacement applied to every workstation and to every user who signed in, regardless of the account used [3].

T1531 Account Access Removal

The same GPO edited the Security Settings client-side extension in GptTmpl.inf to disable the local Administrator account across the domain [3].

How Picus Simulates Payload Ransomware Attacks

We strongly suggest simulating Payload Ransomware Attacks to test the effectiveness of your security controls against real-life cyber attacks using the Picus Platform. You can also test your defenses against hundreds of other ransomware variants, such as Warlock, BlackCat, Black Basta, and Akira, within minutes with a 14-day free trial of the Picus Platform.

Picus Threat Library includes the following threats for the Payload Ransomware Attacks:

Threat ID

Threat Name

Attack Module

54073

Payload Ransomware Group Campaign

Windows Endpoint

Start simulating emerging threats today

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Frequently Asked Questions

What is Payload ransomware?

Payload is a ransomware and data extortion operation that surfaced in February 2026. Payload encrypts Windows and Linux/ESXi systems, appends the .payload extension, steals data before encryption, and publishes victim names on a dedicated leak site. Negotiation runs through a separate Tor portal using credentials issued per victim.

Is Payload ransomware based on Babuk?

Yes. Payload is built on the Babuk source code leaked in September 2021. The service and process kill lists, the curve25519-donna implementation, and the shadow copy deletion command all match the leaked source. The operators replaced Babuk's HC-128 cipher with ChaCha20 and added anti-forensics the original code never had.

How does Payload ransomware encrypt files?

Payload pairs Curve25519 ECDH key agreement with the ChaCha20 stream cipher and generates a fresh key pair for every file. Files below 2 GB are encrypted in full. Files above 2 GB receive 20 percent encryption in 1 MB chunks spaced evenly through the file.

Can Payload encrypted files be decrypted?

No. Without the operator's Curve25519 private key, files encrypted by Payload stay encrypted. The per file private key never reaches disk and lives in memory only for the duration of one file, so it cannot be recovered from the host afterward.

How does Payload ransomware get initial access?

Payload operators enter with valid stolen domain credentials used against external remote services. In the April 2026 incident, the entry point was a FortiGate SSL VPN. No vulnerability was exploited, and Payload has not been linked to any specific CVE.

What are Payload ransomware indicators of compromise?

Encrypted files carry the .payload extension. The mutex is MakeAmericaGreatAgain. Ransom notes appear as RECOVER_payload.txt, RECOVERY-xx0001.txt, or README-payload.txt. The verbose logging framework writes an execution log to C:\payload.log, which survives self-deletion and makes a reliable host indicator.

How do I protect against Payload ransomware?

Enforce multi-factor authentication on remote access, since Payload relies on valid stolen credentials. Restrict and audit who can create and link Group Policy Objects at the domain root. Forward event logs off the endpoint so a local channel wipe does not destroy evidence, and keep backups isolated from domain credentials.

References

[1] Ransomware.live, “Payload,” https://ransomware.live/group/payload

[2] Derp.ca, "Payload ransomware group: mutex MakeAmericaGreatAgain." https://www.derp.ca/research/payload-ransomware-babuk-derivative/

[3] Kaspersky Securelist, "Group Policy hijacked: PAYLOAD ransomware weaponizes Active Directory GPO." https://securelist.com/tr/payload-ransomware-via-group-policy/121335/

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