Key Takeaways
- Payload is a ransomware and data extortion operation that surfaced in February 2026, encrypting Windows and Linux/ESXi hosts.
- Payload encryptors are built on the Babuk source leaked in September 2021, with HC-128 replaced by ChaCha20.
- A fresh Curve25519 key pair per file leaves Payload victims with no recovery path without the operator's private key.
- Some Payload intrusions deploy no encryptor at all, disrupting an entire Windows domain through two malicious Group Policy Objects.
- Payload gains access with valid stolen domain credentials against remote services, with no CVE exploitation on record.
- The Picus Platform simulates Payload ransomware attacks so teams can validate security controls against this threat.
Payload is a ransomware and data extortion operation that surfaced in February 2026 [1]. Victims are mostly in manufacturing, retail, logistics, construction, and healthcare, concentrated in Germany, Egypt, the United States, and Singapore. In some intrusions, the encryptor never touches a Windows endpoint.
Payload builds its encryptors on the Babuk source code leaked in September 2021. The operators replaced Babuk’s HC-128 cipher with ChaCha20 and generate a fresh Curve25519 key pair for every file. They also added anti-forensics the original Babuk code never had, including ETW patching, a full event log channel wipe, and self-deletion through an NTFS alternate data stream [2].
Payload Ransomware at a Glance
|
Field |
Detail |
|
Malware type |
Ransomware and data extortion |
|
Earliest recorded activity |
17 February 2026 |
|
Platforms |
Windows and Linux/ESXi |
|
Code lineage |
Leaked Babuk source from September 2021. |
|
Initial access |
Valid domain credentials against external remote services. |
|
File encryption |
Curve25519 ECDH key agreement with ChaCha20, a fresh key pair per file. |
|
Encryption scope |
Full encryption below 2 GB. Files above 2 GB receive 20 percent encryption. |
|
Encrypted file extension |
.payload |
|
Mutex |
MakeAmericaGreatAgain |
|
Ransom notes |
RECOVER_payload.txt |
|
Recovery disruption |
Shadow copy deletion, backup and security service termination, process termination, recycle bin emptying |
|
Anti-forensics |
ETW patching, event log wipe, self-deletion through an NTFS alternate data stream |
|
Command and control |
None. The Windows encryptor runs offline |
|
Negotiation |
Tor portal with per victim credentials |
What Is Payload Ransomware?
The operators steal data before encryption, publish victim names on their dedicated leak site, and negotiate through a separate Tor portal using credentials issued per victim. The ransom note has no wallet address [2].
The Windows and Linux builds carry different operator public keys, which allows separate key generation per campaign or per affiliate [2].
Babuk Lineage
The service and process kill lists, the curve25519-donna implementation with its clamping logic and the constant 121665, the shadow copy deletion command, and the core of the directory and file exclusion lists all match the leaked Babuk source code [2].
|
Feature |
Babuk (2021) |
Payload (2026) |
|
Symmetric cipher |
HC-128 |
ChaCha20 |
|
Key derivation |
SHA-512 of the shared secret |
Shared secret used directly |
|
File footer |
104 bytes, plaintext, CRC32 |
56 bytes, RC4 encrypted, payload\0 marker |
|
Command line |
Named arguments such as debug, shares, paths |
12 switches, most of them single letters |
|
Mutex |
A string taunting researcher Chuong Dong |
MakeAmericaGreatAgain |
|
Extension |
.babyk |
.payload |
|
Ransom note storage |
Plaintext, patched by the builder |
RC4 encrypted and base64 encoded in .rdata |
|
Large file threshold |
Multiple tiers at 20 MB and 5 MB |
Single threshold at 2 GB, 20 percent encrypted |
|
Self deletion |
Not present |
NTFS ADS rename to :payload |
|
ETW bypass |
Not present |
Patches four ntdll functions |
|
Event log wipe |
Not present |
Enumerates and clears every channel |
The Linux and ESXi Build
The Linux build is a 39 KB stripped ELF aimed at ESXi hosts. It links libxml2 and parses /etc/vmware/hostd/vmInventory.xml through XPath to locate virtual machine disk paths for targeted encryption.
Its anti-debugging checks read /proc/self/status and checks TracerPid for a non-zero value [2].
The cryptography matches the Windows build down to the three-byte RC4 footer key. The Linux build has no service or process killer, no shadow copy deletion, no event log wiper, no ETW patcher, no mutex, and no self-deletion routine [2].
What Are the Major Activities of the Payload Ransomware Group?
- 17 February 2026 - Emerges with Windows and ESXi encryptors.
- 15 March 2026 - Claims a breach of Royal Bahrain Hospital, posting 110 GB with a 23 March deadline [1].
- 13 April 2026 - Cripples a Middle East manufacturer through two malicious GPOs linked at the domain root, encrypting nothing on Windows [3].
- 13 June 2026 - Lists the Intellectual Property Corporation of Malaysia with 35 GB, its first national government agency [1].
- 20 August 2026 - Hits Swiss provider Qualiflex Datacenter with 490 GB, its largest claim, reaching hosted customers including HWZ Zurich [1].
How Does Payload Ransomware Work?
Tactic: Initial Access
T1078 Valid Accounts
In the April 2026 incident, the entry vector was a compromised domain account used to authenticate to the perimeter [3].
The account held enough rights to create and link a GPO at the domain root. That means either domain admin privileges or a delegated equivalent, such as membership of Group Policy Creator Owners combined with link rights on the domain object [3].
T1133 External Remote Services
The entry point was the organization’s FortiGate SSL VPN. No vulnerability was exploited, and Payload has not been linked to any specific CVE. The operator logged in through the normal remote access path with a stolen credential [3].
Tactic: Privilege Escalation
T1484.001 Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification
A GPO linked at the domain root applies to every computer and user object beneath it [3].
Payload operators created two GPOs and linked both at the root.
|
PAYLOAD {C897F2C7-C2AC-4E6F-BF48-58036FF29E79} win Firewall Off {22099AD2-E062-4F56-B574-5099BBA4E7A6} |
|
GPO extension |
Setting or path |
Resulting action |
|
Files (Group Policy Preference) |
SYSVOL hello.txt to Desktop, C:\ and D:\ |
Dropped as README-payload.txt, read only |
|
Registry (Computer) |
legalnoticecaption |
Set to Welcome to Payload! |
|
Registry (Computer) |
legalnoticetext |
Set to the ransom demand text |
|
Personalization Policy |
Lock screen image |
Points to payload.jpg in SYSVOL |
|
Desktop Policy (User) |
Wallpaper path |
Points to payload.jpg in SYSVOL |
|
Security Settings (GptTmpl.inf) |
Administrator account status |
Disabled |
Table 1. Settings delivered by the PAYLOAD GPO [3].
The two registry values rewrite the pre-logon legal notice, so the ransom demand appears before anyone can sign in.
|
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\legalnoticecaption = Welcome to Payload! HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\legalnoticetext = <ransom demand text> |
The wallpaper image and ransom note were staged on the domain controller’s SYSVOL share and pushed to endpoints through the Files client-side extension [3].
|
\\DC.THECOMPANY.local\sysvol\THECOMPANY.local\payload.jpg # wallpaper and lock screen image \\DC.THECOMPANY.local\sysvol\THECOMPANY.local\hello.txt # source of README-payload.txt |
The GPOs were authored on 13 April, with visible impact landing a day later because computer configuration settings apply on reboot or policy refresh and no endpoint had rebooted in the interim. That gap gave the operator a quiet window for exfiltration and broke the temporal link between the GPO creation event in the directory log and the mass disruption that followed [3].
Tactic: Defense Impairment
T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
The bypass-etw switch patches four functions in ntdll.dll. The encryptor makes the page writable with VirtualProtect, overwrites each function prologue, and restores the protection [2].
|
; prologue overwritten in ntdll.dll for ; EtwEventWrite, EtwEventWriteFull, EtwEventWriteTransfer, EtwRegister 48 33 C0 C3 ; WoW64 build: xor rax, rax ; ret 33 C0 C2 14 00 ; native x86: xor eax, eax ; ret 0x14 |
Both patches make the function return STATUS_SUCCESS immediately, so every trace event it would have written is dropped. EDR that depends on ETW for process-level visibility loses that feed. The patch applies to the encryptor’s own copy of ntdll.dll, so ETW keeps working elsewhere on the host [3][2].
The binary also stops services through the Service Control Manager API and kills processes through toolhelp snapshots.
The service list covers backup infrastructure such as Veeam and Acronis and security products such as Sophos and Qihoo 360. The 31 entry process list covers database engines, Office applications, mail clients, and browsers. Both lists are character identical to the lists in the leaked Babuk source [2].
T1685.005 Disable or Modify Tools: Clear Windows Event Logs
The l switch triggers a wipe of every Windows event log channel. The binary loads wevtapi.dll at runtime, which keeps the APIs out of its import table, enumerates all channels, and clears them one by one. Application, Security, System, and every custom operational channel are cleared [2].
|
wevtapi.dll # loaded at runtime, absent from the import table EvtOpenChannelEnum # open the channel enumeration handle EvtNextChannelPath # walk every channel, operational ones included EvtClearLog # clear each channel in turn |
T1686 Disable or Modify System Firewall
The second GPO, named win Firewall Off, disabled Windows Firewall on the domain, private, and public profiles across all endpoints. It was linked at the domain root independently of the PAYLOAD GPO [3].
Tactic: Stealth
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
The ransom note is stored in the .rdata section as an RC4 encrypted, base64 encoded blob.
The RC4 key for the note sits separately at virtual address 0x452DC8 as a base64 string that decodes to the 32-character ASCII key hQEPINuTY2lytufLDpJQdVkrWlovC1QR [2].
|
0x4F560: "expand 32-byte k" ChaCha20 sigma constant (16 bytes) 0x4F570: "FBI\0" RC4 key for the file footer (3 bytes + null) 0x4F574: "aH9Tbdc+qPcQ..." operator Curve25519 public key, base64 (44 bytes) 0x4F5A0: \0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0 padding (8 bytes) 0x4F5A8: "IlhBex9EMIS7..." RC4 encrypted ransom note, base64 (2528 bytes) |
T1564.004 Hide Artifacts: NTFS File Attributes
The binary renames its own $DATA stream to an alternate data stream named :payload. The rename releases the file lock Windows holds on a running executable, which normally blocks a process from deleting itself [2].
T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion
After the stream rename, the binary reopens the file and marks it for deletion on close. No cmd.exe child process is spawned, and no temporary batch file is written, so the self-deletion artifacts that most ransomware families leave in process telemetry never appear. The d switch turns the routine off [2].
Its verbose logging framework writes an execution log to C:\payload.log, which survives the self-deletion and makes a reliable host indicator [2].
T1622 Debugger Evasion
The Windows build uses GetTickCount timing checks. The Linux build reads /proc/self/status and treats a non-zero TracerPid value as a sign that it is being traced [2].
Tactic: Discovery
T1083 File and Directory Discovery
The Windows encryptor walks local and network drives and applies directory and file exclusion lists whose core comes from Babuk. It skips its own ransom note and any file that already carries the .payload extension. The i switch bypasses every filter [2].
On ESXi, the Linux build parses /etc/vmware/hostd/vmInventory.xml through XPath to pull virtual machine disk paths, then encrypts those paths [2].
T1135 Network Share Discovery
The Windows encryptor reaches network drives by default. The s switch skips network shares, which lets an operator keep a run local when a sweep across shares would be too noisy [2].
T1057 Process Discovery
The binary enumerates running processes through toolhelp snapshots before terminating the ones on its kill list [2]. In the April 2026 incident, Kaspersky GERT also recovered two standalone process killer tools, killer.exe and kill.exe, on the affected network [3].
Tactic: Collection
T1005 Data from Local System
In the April 2026 incident, exfiltration was observed originating from the file servers and several additional systems on 13 April, the same day the GPOs were authored [3].
Tactic: Impact
T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact
Payload uses Curve25519 ECDH for key agreement and ChaCha20 for file encryption. Each file gets a fresh key pair [2].
|
priv = CryptGenRandom(32) # Curve25519 private key, clamped nonce = CryptGenRandom(12) # ChaCha20 nonce pub = curve25519_base(priv) # per file public key key = curve25519(priv, operator_pub) # shared secret, used directly, no hashing step # ChaCha20 over the file in 1 MB chunks: # NtReadFile -> encrypt -> seek back -> NtWriteFile footer = RC4("FBI", pub || nonce || 4 bytes stack residue || "payload\0") # 56 bytes, appended to the file zero(priv); zero(pub) # wiped on the stack once the footer is written |
The operator’s public key is decoded from base64 at startup. The shared secret becomes the ChaCha20 key directly, with no derivation step. The per file private key never reaches disk and lives in memory only for the duration of one file [2].
Files below 2 GB are encrypted in full. Files above 2 GB receive 20 percent encryption, calculated as file size divided by five, in 1 MB chunks spaced evenly through the file [2].
Without the operator’s Curve25519 private key, the files stay encrypted [2].
T1489 Service Stop
Stopping database, mail, virtualization, and backup services releases file handles so locked data can be modified, and interrupts the backup activity that would otherwise run during encryption [3][2].
T1490 Inhibit System Recovery
The encryptor deletes Volume Shadow Copies with the same command found in the leaked Babuk source [2].
|
vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet |
T1491.001 Internal Defacement
The PAYLOAD GPO replaced the desktop wallpaper and the lock screen with payload.jpg served from SYSVOL, and rewrote the pre-logon legal notice to carry the ransom demand. The defacement applied to every workstation and to every user who signed in, regardless of the account used [3].
T1531 Account Access Removal
The same GPO edited the Security Settings client-side extension in GptTmpl.inf to disable the local Administrator account across the domain [3].
How Picus Simulates Payload Ransomware Attacks
We strongly suggest simulating Payload Ransomware Attacks to test the effectiveness of your security controls against real-life cyber attacks using the Picus Platform. You can also test your defenses against hundreds of other ransomware variants, such as Warlock, BlackCat, Black Basta, and Akira, within minutes with a 14-day free trial of the Picus Platform.
Picus Threat Library includes the following threats for the Payload Ransomware Attacks:
|
Threat ID |
Threat Name |
Attack Module |
|
54073 |
Payload Ransomware Group Campaign |
Windows Endpoint |
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