BlackCat Ransomware Gang
By Huseyin Can YUCEEL & Picus Labs August 22, 2022 Ransomware
BlackCat, also known as ALPHV, rose quickly in prominence because it is written in Rust, a language that supports reliable cross platform development and complicates traditional malware analysis. By leveraging Rust, operators can compile flexible builds that run on Windows, Linux, and VMware ESXi, which broadens impact across mixed enterprise environments. Security tools that were tuned primarily for C or C++ families often need additional tuning to inspect Rust binaries, and this gap has helped BlackCat affiliates evade some detections. The operation runs as a Ransomware as a Service program and uses double extortion, combining data theft with encryption to pressure victims into payment and to speed negotiations.
Adoption accelerated after the decline of large crews such as Conti and REvil, with experienced affiliates and groups including FIN12 and DEV 0504 pivoting to BlackCat for its speed, tooling, and support. Initial access commonly comes from phishing, valid credentials purchased from initial access brokers, or exploitation of internet facing services and edge devices. Once inside, operators map the environment, escalate privileges, and move laterally using living off the land techniques and common admin tools. BlackCat variants include support for targeting virtual infrastructure, disabling security agents, and removing backups or shadow copies to hinder recovery. Affiliates stage and exfiltrate sensitive data to hosted leak sites before encryption, then launch fast, multi threaded encryptors that can be customized per victim.
Organizations can reduce risk by enforcing multifactor authentication for remote and privileged access, rapidly patching exposed services, hardening and monitoring hypervisors and virtualization management interfaces, and segmenting critical systems so an intrusion cannot move freely. Maintain tested offline backups, watch for unusual data movement and new archive creation, and collect command line and process telemetry to detect lateral movement, credential access, and mass encryption behaviors. Continuous validation against real attacker techniques helps confirm that controls can detect and contain BlackCat activity before it reaches data theft and widespread encryption.

Associated Groups |
Aliases - ALPHV, Noberus Successor - BlackMatter and REvil |
Associated Country |
Russia |
First Seen |
November 2021 |
Target Sectors |
Aviation, Construction, Education, Energy, Entertainment, Fashion, Financial Services, Government, Hospitality, Information Technology, Transportation |
Target Countries |
United States, Australia, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Romania, Spain, Taiwan, United Kingdom |

Business Models |
Ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) Triple Extortion Initial Access Brokers (IABs) |
Extortion Tactics |
File Encryption |
Initial Access Methods |
Exploit Public-Facing Application External Remote Services Valid Account |
Impact Methods |
Data Encryption Data Exfiltration |

Application |
Vulnerability |
CVE |
CVSS |
Fortinet FortiGate |
Path Traversal |
9.8 Critical |

MITRE ATT&CK Tactic |
Tools |
Execution
|
Cobalt Strike PowerShell Windows Task Scheduler |
Persistence |
Windows Task Scheduler |
Credential Access |
LaZagne Mimikatz |
Lateral Movement |
PSExec |
Command and Control |
Cobalt Strike Koadic |
Exflitration |
ExMatter (Fendr) malware |
Impact |
BlackCat Locker malware Vssadmin |
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